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The multivalent binary distinction between radical and moderate religion plays a key part in 
the rhetoric and strategy of European governments in their attempts to produce European 
Muslim citizens whose primary political loyalty lies with the society and state in which they 
live. It also plays a key part in public discourse about European Muslims and their 
citizenship. In what follows, I focus especially on one relatively constructive use of the 
distinction in the UK, offer an account of its logic through a reading of the political theology 
of John Locke and a critique of its effects upon a religious tradition that draws on the analysis
of Hans W. Frei. Frei’s account suggests that to the extent that this logic has shaped Christian 
self-understanding, it tends to eclipse the wellsprings of the critically constructive 
engagement of Christians in the public sphere and public institutions constitutive of a 
pluralist, democratic society. This assessment in turn raises questions about the impact of the 
moderate/radical binary in respect of sources of constructive critical engagement by citizens 
with other religious identities.
Moderate Muslims in British political and public discourse
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tyler Golson (2007) trace the ways in which European 
governments, in response to the attack on New York on 9/11 and subsequent attacks on 
several European cities, revised their policies toward their minority Muslim populations. 
Those responses converged on a common strategy: alongside long-standing policies of 
integration, they sought to make the state the ‘arbiter and chief architect of a “moderate” 
European Islam’ (Haddad and Golson 2007, 488). Against a background of growing public 
concern about the threat said to be posed by transnational Islam to Western societies, they 
aimed to sever Muslims’ transnational ties and fashion ‘loyal Muslim citizens that share 
European values’ (Haddad and Golson 2007, 488, 498).’1 In this context certain terms, 
deployed in the attempt to shape European Islam, attract particular resentment: ‘Underlying 
the very public Muslim condemnations of state policy lies a perception that the state is trying 
to manipulate Muslims and destroy their Islamic identity by means of sowing dissent in the 
guise of “integration,” “moderation,” and “cooperation”’ (Haddad and Golson 2007, 513). 
It is not only governments, however, who use such language. Similar usages are easily 
documented in the media. In consequence, as Safraz Mansoor (2015) relates of his 
interviewees, Muslims will use the term ‘moderate’ to distance themselves from the 
perpetrators of attacks in the name of Islam – as one would expect, given its force and 
currency. However, their usage does not necessarily match the government’s, where 
‘moderate' denotes an adherence to certain liberal values such as belief in freedom of 
expression and acceptance of equality in gender and sexuality. They resent, moreover, its 
implication, that a moderate Muslim ‘is someone who is not especially devout.’ To them, it is 
as though Muslims had to choose between association with violent extremism as the 
concomitant of integrity and intensity of religious commitment, and an acceptable, secular 
identity as the accompaniment of a diminished degree of religious devotion.
The moderate/radical binary is amenable to a plurality of uses. Minority groups within 
Muslim populations in Europe use it to define themselves favorably as moderates over 
against Sunni communities whom they represent as evincing radicalizing tendencies 
(Scharbrodt 2011). Nor is the binary always used, as it is in France, to police a public/private 
boundary that confines religious expression to the latter sphere (see Marvelli 2012, 160-1). 
For example, British Governments, commentators and Muslims organizations have used the 
moderate label, and/or associated terms and values to more constructively to legitimate the 
participation of Muslim charities and representative bodies in civil society – and to give them
space to articulate religious reasons for that participation. This move appears to be part of a 
broader shift of policy. The British Coalition Government signaled recognition of some of the
problems identified by Haddad and Golson in its Review of the Prevent Strategy (Home 
Office 2011).2 David Cameron’s Munich Speech in that same year recognized and repudiated 
the distinction between moderate and extremist Muslims. Furthermore, that Government’s 
now much-derided Big Society initiative seemed to offer the opportunity for a more 
constructive strategy in the framing of European Muslim identity in public policy in terms of 
the moderate/extremist binary, modulating the traditional emphasis on integration to 
complement a revised securitization of Muslims. 
Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, writing for the think-tank Demos in 2010, 
recognized this opportunity. Their report, From Security to Citizens, retains the 
extremist/moderate distinction. The terms ‘extremism’ and ‘violent extremism’ recur 
throughout the report and they contrast extremist with moderate movements (Bartlett and 
Birdwell 2010, 19, 21). Amongst their recommendations, however, was the suggestion that 
extremism (as distinct from violent extremism) was best countered by fostering community 
cohesion. Community cohesion, they argued, should inspire and encourage people to become 
active citizens who imagine a shared future with those different from themselves. It would 
also build resilience to violent extremist ideologies. The vision of the Big Society, thus, 
would best address the cause of violent extremism (see also Bartlett 2010). Political and 
social protest and activism offered an alternative to extremism, a kind of safety valve, Bartlett
argued in a Guardian Comment piece (2010). The Home Office’s Prevent Strategy review 
proposed ceasing Prevent funding for integration projects, but acknowledged that counter-
terrorism depends on ‘a successful integration strategy’ (Home Office 2011, 3.1.4) because 
communities which do not participate in civic society tend to be more vulnerable to 
radicalization (Home Office 2011, 6.20-1, 30) (Home Office 2011, 6, 27, 30). 
Indeed, the rhetoric of the Big Society with its embrace of faith-based provision, combined
with the gaps in welfare provision created by austerity policies (and with government 
cooperation with charitable organizations to provide public services), have created a space in 
which faith groups can participate actively in civil society, and present a religious rationale 
for their contribution to the building of society or the Common Good. This more constructive 
approach, then, offers a less polarizing kind of discipline of religious identities to the one I 
first described. Here authentic religion is moderate in its devotion, but not secular.
This second approach aims to foster the integration of communities in British society and 
their participation in civic society as a way of making them more resilient to radicalization. 
Implicit in this account is the retention of a moderate/radical binary. The Prevent Strategy 
report opposes extremist, radical organizations which oppose universal human rights, equality
before the law, democracy and full participation in society (and sanction the use of violence) 
to integrated communities with ‘legitimate religious belief’ which adhere to those values 
(2011, 1, 5-6). It states that the policy should afford to ‘interested organizations, from the 
student arena to the worlds of business and politics, with an opportunity they should welcome
to declare unequivocally that they oppose extremism and all its consequences’ (2011, 4). 
David Cameron’s Munich speech distinguishes authentic, peaceful Islam as compatible with 
democracy from the warped, violent political ideology of Islamism and from Islamic 
extremism (2011). Islamism, he contends, aims at an Islamic realm and Islamic extremism is 
defined by its hostility to Western democracy and liberal values. Thus this second strategy 
still defines good and bad Islam essentially in terms of conformity or threat to liberal 
democracy. It maintains the pressure on religious groups to identify themselves in these same 
terms and to moderate the public character of their religion and its civic participation 
accordingly. In this way, it frames moderate religious identity as authentically religious, yet 
defines authentic religion in terms of its compatibility with an account of British citizenship 
and national values.
John Locke and the moderation of religion
This approach to moderating religious identities and their public expression has a history. 
Haddad and Golson point out that the various governmental policies toward European 
Muslim minorities follow, in a drastically accelerated way, the different patterns of relations 
whereby European states gradually and painfully domesticated Christianity and Judaism over 
several centuries of modernization (2007, 513). John Locke’s account of toleration has been 
particularly influential in this process in British and North American contexts, and displays 
well the logic of this version of the moderate/radical binary. My reading of Locke takes its 
cues from recent studies by Judd Owen (2014) and Elizabeth Pritchard (2013). 
Locke’s argument in the Letter on Toleration, first published in 1689, is illumined by the 
political theology of his Second Treatise on Government, published in the same year. As 
Pritchard notes (2013, 61), Locke’s political theology is grounded in natural law, the basis of 
which is God. That law is reason, which teaches that no-one has the right to harm another in 
life, health, liberty or property since all are God’s workmanship and property, of which God 
alone may dispose (Locke 1988, 271). Hence, we are bound to preserve ourselves and – 
insofar as this is consistent with self-preservation – the rest of humanity and to not impair 
what tends to its preservation. Hence also all we have the right to restrain or destroy those 
who invade others’ rights, and to reparation in satisfaction of those losses and injuries they 
inflict upon us. This right we give over to Civil Government to preclude the chaos of 
everyone judging their own affairs and the possibility of endless war without the possibility 
of arbitration (1988, 275-6). Reason also teaches, and Revelation concurs, that God gave the 
world to humans for their use and enjoyment (1988, 285-6), and in particular to the 
‘industrious and rational’, to improve it (1988, 291). On this basis, we can appropriate natural
resources by extending that ownership we have of ourselves to other non-human things by 
mixing them with our labor, which is our property in action, as it were (1988, 287-8, 292).
Locke firmly separates religion from the regulation of human earthly self-preservation, 
security and flourishing, founded on such rights, in the Letter Concerning Toleration. Care of 
the commonwealth is the business of the magistrate, and is the proper subject of the 
magistrate’s coercive power for the upholding of the laws that preserve this-worldly goods of 
life, liberty, health and possessions (Locke 1983, 26-7). The magistrate’s power jurisdiction 
does not extend to religion, however. For religious societies have a different focus – the care 
of souls, the worship of God for acquiring eternal life – and membership of them is voluntary 
(1983, 28-30). Church discipline, which rests on common consent alone, is ordered to this 
end. The power of religious societies is of a different kind from that of the magistrate: it is the
power of persuasion, in the performance of a spiritual duty of care through exhortation and 
argument. As Elizabeth Pritchard points out (2013), religion for Locke is public but how to 
worship is a matter of individual choice – like fashion, to which Locke compares differences 
over worship – a choice which cannot be taken away from another but only influenced by 
word and example. In this way, she argues, Locke seeks to separate religion from the pursuit 
of earthly goods, from embodied identities and coercive power and put it into circulation as a 
matter of preference and public persuasion. Indeed, Locke enjoins ecclesiastical authorities to
exhort their co-religionists to the duties of ‘charity, meekness and toleration’ to all (Locke 
1983, 34).
In this way, there is a clear concern in the Letter to reconfigure religion such that it will 
not give rise to anything which might interrupt or disturb the pursuit of earthly goods and 
flourishing in bodily health and private property. For that is the danger which Locke’s strict 
delineation of the responsibilities of the magistrate for civil matters and his advocacy that the 
magistrate and religious societies should tolerate differences in religion aims to avert. The use
of coercive power to enforce certain religious beliefs and practices and ban others is 
destructive of the peaceful pursuit of all that makes for that preservation to which all have a 
right. Such invasion of civil rights through religious persecution is ‘a pernicious… Seed of 
Discord and War’, a “powerful provocation to endless Hatreds, Rapines, and Slaughters” 
(Locke 1983, 32). Indeed, where dominion is founded on grace and religion is propagated by 
arms, there can be no peace and security (Locke 1983, 33). The only limits of toleration are 
where religious views undermine the basis for that peace and security: those holding that the 
bonds which hold society together are dissoluble on religious grounds; the person whose 
religion binds them in loyalty to a foreign power (a transnational connection); and the person 
who denies the divine donator of the rights of humans to life and property (the atheist) (Locke
1983, 49-51).
In part, Locke’s account rests on the incompatibility of coercion with true religion. True 
religion cannot be coercive because it is a matter of inner conviction. It consists ‘in the 
inward persuasion of the mind’ which cannot be compelled to belief by external force and 
indeed is subverted by coercion (Locke 1983, 26-7, 38). Hence it is not really religion that is 
responsible for conflict, but the refusal of toleration motivated by avarice and lust for power 
(1983, 53-55). Locke also appeals to uncertainty regarding the religious matters about which 
religious groups disagree and wherein the magistrate has no more epistemic privilege than 
anyone else (1983, 36-7). (Owen connects this argument to Locke’s account of faith and 
reason in the Essay on Human Understanding (2014, 68-80).) 
Locke’s argument also rests on a positive account of authentic religion, however, and of 
authentic Christianity in particular. Toleration, he announces, is ‘the chief characteristical 
mark of the True Church’ (Locke 1983, 23). For true Christianity is characterized by ‘charity, 
meekness, and goodwill in general towards all Mankind’ (1983, 23). Jesus’ method of 
proselytizing, moreover, is to preach the gospel and show it forth by his exemplary holiness, 
not resort to the sword. (1983, 25). 
As many scholars have pointed out, Locke’s account of toleration rests on theological 
grounds which seem to restrict its applicability to secular and highly pluralistic societies. 
Nevertheless, its considerable homology with the British government’s approach to shaping 
religious identities makes it analytically useful. For Locke offers an account of religion 
shaped around values very similar to many of those to which the government takes adherence
as its yardstick of a community’s integration into British society. He makes the case for an 
account of religion, and of Christianity in particular, where authentic religion does not 
interfere in the divinely ordained priority and inviolability of the pursuit of individual life, 
liberty, health and property within a society ordered to the preservation of the same. Indeed, 
he goes so far as to define the essence of religion in terms of a value whose meaning 
encapsulates the others: toleration as the separation of the magistrate’s coercive power from 
religious matters (except in the case of those who deny the basis for rights to life and property
on religious grounds and those who owe religious loyalties to states other than the one which 
upholds those rights). 
Hans Frei on Locke, biblical narrative and Christian political contribution to 
western society
John Locke thus exemplifies the political dimension of a tendency in modern theology of 
which the Yale historian and theologian Hans W. Frei was a persistent critic. The consistent 
objects of Frei’s concern were modern theologians who sought to commend the 
meaningfulness or credibility of Christianity by interpreting its central claims in terms of, or 
in positive, systematic correlation with, a putatively general account of human religiosity. His
complaint was that such endeavors subverted the meaning of those core claims, as grounded 
the narrative structure of certain biblical stories privileged in Christian tradition. This 
problem was political insofar as the structure of those stories supplies the basic framework 
for the various ways in which Christians imagine the world they inhabit, understand their 
place in it, interpret their experiences of it and orient their actions accordingly – including, 
we may infer, their participation in society. 
Locke occurs in the work for which Frei is best known, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. 
There Frei traces the breakdown of the pre-modern practice of reading realistic biblical 
narratives literally and figurally. By ‘realistic’ he has in mind stories in the Old Testament and
the synoptic gospels whose meaning is a matter of the way they depict the events with which 
they have to do – their ‘narrative shape’, including the device of chronological sequence – 
and in which characters are ‘firmly and significantly set’ in their natural and social contexts 
so that characters are depicted in relation to their circumstances and vice versa, in ordinary 
language (Frei 1974, 13-15). Such stories were thus ‘history-like’ and where read literally – 
attending to this realistic meaning – they were taken also to describe actual historical 
occurrences (1974, 2). Linked together in sequence as one story, where Old Testament stories 
were taken as figures fulfilled in New Testament stories, these stories were taken to depict a 
single history, that of the real world, which embraced the experience of every reader (1974, 2-
3). Readers were to see the shape of their lives and of contemporary events, their dispositions,
actions and sufferings, as figures of this world (1974, 3). This practice fostered a sense of the 
providential governance of God mysteriously at work in readers’ lives and the wider world to 
which they belonged, for to see oneself and one’s circumstances as figures of the biblical 
world was to perceive a unity in the divine plan in the correspondences between the shape of 
one’s life and wider history and biblical meaning-patterns (1974, 28-9). It was to see these 
things as figures in the providential narrative (174, 153). The composite biblical story 
changed with changing interpretations, and figural interpretation was a delicate affair, but the 
story performed this function until the advent of modernity (1974, 3-4). 
This way of approaching biblical narratives – and of imagining the world and oneself in it 
– began to come apart in the seventeenth century and broke down increasingly rapidly in the 
eighteenth. What drove its collapse was a shift in sensibility in which biblical stories no 
longer mediated access to the shape of history. Instead, biblical narratives were seen as 
logically distinct from the historical events they depict, which are also accessible in other 
ways, raising questions about the relationship between the stories and those (1974, 4-6). The 
meaning of the stories came to be understood in terms, therefore, of their ostensive reference 
or failure to refer to historical actualities. In this way, the finding of figural connections 
between stories or between stories and contemporary experience became less and less 
plausible (1974, 6-7). Frei mentions Locke both as an example of someone whose exegesis 
illustrates this shift (1974, 6) and whose understanding of linguistic meaning in terms of 
reference to independent reality via the author’s thought and sense perception provided the 
basis for the arguments of his friend, Anthony Collins, against the reference of Old Testament
prophecy to Jesus Christ (1974, 75-78). Scriptural meaning for Locke and Collins was a 
matter of verbal propositions describing a single external state of affairs or the workings of 
the mind, which obey the same rules as all language, and make sense in the way other 
language does: in relation to what we can already know with our own reason (1974, 81-84).  
Locke is also for Frei the first apologetic theologian, seeking in his On the Reasonableness of
Christianity to argue ‘the intelligibility of [Christianity’s] way of discoursing, the importance 
of its concerns for the life of mankind at large, and the meaningfulness of its real truth claims’
(1974, 117). He was one of those who maintained both that the historicity of biblical events 
as the basis of the Bible’s religious content and that its religious meaning or truth depended 
on a broader religious content beyond its particular claims (1974, 118, 125). In maintaining 
that the meaning of biblical narrative was propositional and referential, and that their 
meaningfulness had to do with its relationship to general accounts of human moral and 
religious experience, Locke typifies an influential tradition in modern theology (1974, 128). 
What this tradition failed to do, Frei argues, was pay attention to the narrative meaning of 
these texts in its own right, as the story of salvation in which the narrative rendering of Jesus 
as Messiah is a core ingredient, quite apart from the question of whether he was in fact, or 
whether the claim was still meaningful. It failed to do so because of this apologetic concern 
to harmonize the stories’ meaning with their meaningfulness (1974, 133-34). In other words, 
this tradition was unable to pay attention to that which was basic to pre-modern Christian 
practice and to a pre-modern Christian sensibility, however varied the forms these might take,
and to the central figure in Christian tradition, Jesus Christ as portrayed in the gospel stories. 
This elision is the condition of possibility of Locke’s account of Christianity in The Letter.
There is a brief, general claim about a portion of Jesus’ story – his ministry – which is mainly
negative in force: he did not use coercion. There is a brief appeal to love for all as the basis of
the claim that the essence of Christianity is tolerance as Locke defines it. But the story of 
Jesus Christ with its narrative structure has no bearing on Locke’s account of Christianity or 
toleration. Locke’s propositional view of the gospel stories is not to the fore in his account of 
toleration (though the appeal to Jesus’ ministry is consistent with it), but his apologetic 
method is. For Locke’s claim that Christianity is essentially toleration expresses the 
meaningfulness of the Christian story in relation to the prior conclusions to Locke’s natural 
law argument for individual rights to life, liberty, health and property. 
At stake in this eclipse of biblical narrative, on Frei’s account, is the political contribution 
of Christian community to modern western culture. In the 1980s, Frei re-thought the terms of 
his critique and its constructive implications, as a question of what kind of theology, and what
kind of relationship between theology and other disciplines (philosophy, social science) 
would be most hospitable to the basic Christian practice of attention to the Jesus depicted in 
the gospel narratives, which he called ‘the literal sense’. In this context, Frei urged that 
Christianity had much to gain in respect of its own reading practices by learning from 
Judaism and Midrash (1993b, 148-9). Such a renewal of Christianity’s relationship with 
Judaism might also help Christianity recover its vocation as a religion after the demise of its 
role in western Christendom. For the literal sense could be expected to play a significant part 
in the contribution of Christian community to western culture or its residues, ‘including its 
political life, its quest for justice and freedom…’ (1993b, 149). In what ways might what Frei
now called ‘literal reading’ might be significant for the political contribution of Christian 
community after Christendom?
At the heart of Locke’s notion of toleration, and hence of his notion of Christianity and of 
religion in general is the separation of religion as a matter of inward conviction and public 
persuasion from the earthly goods which go into the preservation of self and others, including
property, the rights we have to them and the obligation to punish or destroy those who invade 
those rights, which the state assumes for us. On Frei’s account of pre-modern literal and 
figural reading of biblical narrative, however, that distinction does not obtain, for the readers 
of biblical narrative are, like biblical characters, thoroughly integrated in their social setting. 
As figures of the biblical world, they make sense of their lives and circumstances as 
ingredients in a providential story, and fit themselves into it by their actions. Such religion is 
thus much more than inward persuasion; it has to do with the whole shape of one’s life and 
that of the history of which one is a part. 
There is here a kind of Christian secular sensibility both more secular and more resilient 
than Locke’s natural law account of human rights. It is more resilient in its eschewal of 
reliance upon arguments for the existence and intentions of God that no longer seem like the 
obvious teachings of a universal rationality, and in relying instead upon the vitality of 
Christian practice which has endured through all kinds of shifts of conceptuality. The dignity 
of human beings as figures of God’s saving history rests on their inclusion in the story of 
salvation as social beings belonging in particular circumstances, and (we might infer by 
extension) particular places, and not in contrast to their natural environment. It does not rest 
on anything inherent in them, like Locke’s notion of self-ownership, or which sacralizes their 
capacities, as Locke sacralizes human property-making by an implied analogy between the 
divine labor of creation (realizing human beings as God’s property) and human’s mixing their
labor with non-human things and so raising the self-owning property-maker to the level of 
demiurges with the right to confect exclusive ownership from nature’s abundant yet placeless 
extensity in the endless and unqualified pursuit of their self-preservation. In this sense, it is a 
more secular vision than Locke’s.
Because the story of salvation centered upon the stories of Jesus takes priority on Frei’s 
approach, it allows for a sense of providence shaped by that story that has political 
significance. In Frei’s The Identity of Jesus Christ (1975) he argues for an account of 
providence and a practice of reading clues in history which – without investing history with 
any inherent telos – discerns imperfect figures of redemption, reconciliation and resurrection 
in a history constituted by the interaction of church and the events, collectivities and 
institutions of the world (Frei 1975, 157-164; 1993b, 231). Frei certainly argued for such a 
vision, his ethic of patterning one’s life after the shape of Jesus’ obedient love for neighbor 
must be seen in the context of the hope and breadth of finite responsibility. On such a basis, 
he affirmed the affinity of the gospel of God’s universal providential governance and a 
‘carefully circumscribed progressive politics’ and called for a public theology that would 
speak from such a perspective to urge America away from exceptionalism and the anxieties 
of global power to a modest international role among other nations, a humanitarianism 
‘modified by Christian hope’ (1993c, 231). 
Frei does not attempt to commend the Christian practice of the literal sense, or the 
providential imagination which it can foster, or the politics that such an imagination might 
inform, by appeal to the canons of a universal rationality. He was highly skeptical about the 
possibility or wisdom of a natural theology and about the capacity of general theories 
adequately to explain particular characteristics of various religious practices. Christian literal 
readings are warranted, he argues, by agreement with the community’s rules for reading the 
sacred text (1993b, 144). These rules – which amount to a minimal, flexible consensus – are 
in turn grounded in the community’s experience of living with the text (1993a, 104). Yet these
practices, and the meanings of Christian literal readings of biblical stories and Christian 
figural construals of the world which inform them, are not private or esoteric. While general 
explanatory theories serve them badly, they may be described as coherent systems of 
meaning, adapting concepts in wider circulation on an ad hoc basis (1993b, 143-147). 
Particular practices or construals may thus be made public and opened to challenge on both 
internal and external grounds.
Religious particularity and civic and democratic participation
This analysis of Frei’s critique of Locke and its political significance raises a question about 
attempts by the state (and other agencies) to further the civic and democratic participation of 
religious communities while attempting to discipline religious communities into espousing 
moderate identities which are defined by no more than their renunciation of radicalism and 
their adherence to a limited set of values. The Prevent Strategy is right to value the 
participation of religious communities in civic society and democratic processes. There is a 
good deal of scholarship that demonstrates that religious communities can make significant 
contributions to the renewal of civic society and making powerful institutions more 
democratic accountability (e.g. Bretherton 2015; Marsh 2005; Stout 2010). My analysis of 
Locke and Frei raises the troubling possibility that the moderating of religious identities 
might foster forms of ‘moderate’ discourse in which the concern to demonstrate relevance 
and conformity to the norms of moderate religion articulated by the state and others might 
lead to the eclipse of those core aspects of their traditions which might otherwise resource a 
richer, more resilient and creative constructive contribution to civil society and democratic 
practice, one which  comes from the heart of their religious identity.
Frei’s own social ethics is not necessarily representative of the discipline of Christian 
social ethics in either North America or Britain. Nor can one necessarily read across from the 
academic discipline to the theological discourses of Christian communities who are 
constructively engaged in civil society and local or national democratic practices. Nor do all 
Christian communities seek to engage in these ways or see such engagement as consistent 
with their Christian identity. Yet it is not implausible to think that he has identified some 
conditions of possibility of what makes for a richly creative, constructive and resilient 
contribution to civil society and democratic practice in the case of Christianity, conditions 
which support a variety of different approaches and a healthy debate among them. 
While Frei himself identified an analogue to the literal sense in Jewish Midrash, we cannot
assume that all religious traditions are like Christianity in some degree or other, or that 
comparison with Christianity or Judaism is the most helpful way to interpret them. Yet with 
considerable caution, we could attempt to widen the cautionary point I am trying to make. 
Frei articulates and connects two issues whose pertinence for religious communities in 
secular, pluralistic contexts may not be limited to Judaism and Christianity. First, can one 
identity a source in its practices of the identity of a religious tradition through all its changes?
Second, to the extent that the tradition’s source of identity orients the community toward 
constructive engagement with society, what forms of conceptual self-description – intelligible
beyond the community – will best foster the community’s vocation in a society where it will 
not expect to supply that society’s ideological basis and coherence? If we grant that those 
questions are useful and cogent, then I think we can also see how the dangers of moderating 
religion Frei identifies with respect to Christianity in the modern West might well be echoed 
in respect of other religious communities in the same context. For Frei’s analysis suggests 
that we be open to the possibility that it is when a religious community is most radical – by 
returning to renew itself from its roots – that it may have most to offer to a pluralistic, secular
society.
By framing authentic religious identity, and denoting this authentic identity as religiously 
moderate over against religiously radical, the state pressures religious communities to 
moderate the particularities and complexities of their traditions in order to present their 
conformity to liberal democracy and values. Such domestication may well subvert the 
capacities of religious communities and individuals to draw creatively on the resources of 
their traditions in order to participate constructively in political life in ways that we might not
anticipate. For the attempt to moderate religious communities’ identities in terms of 
compatibility with liberal democracy and values in rhetoric and public policy has a defensive 
posture. It casts liberal democracy as something essentially given and fixed, rather than as an 
evolving project receptive to diverse contributions. The energies of government and state-
regulated institutions might better be directed away from the ‘moderation’ of religious 
identity to the task of configuring public institutions, civil organizations and democratic 
forms so as to be most hospitable to ‘radical’ religious contributions and the public exposition
of what Nick Adams (2006) calls the ‘deep reasonings’ that inform them. 
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